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A B S T R A C T
The Electric Power Infrastructure Sector is a uniquely critical sector among other critical infrastructures.
Disruptions to or failures of its functions would result in extensive effects, not only on society itself but also on all
of the (other) dependent critical infrastructure sectors. The key areas of electric power supply systems that
demonstrate the greatest vulnerability to terrorist attacks include the following areas of vulnerability: physical
vulnerability, cyber vulnerability and personnel vulnerability. Considerable attention is devoted to the problems
and issues of external anthropogenic threats (e.g. terrorism). Internal intentional anthropogenic threats re-
present an almost neglected sector in the field of security research. Based on this fact, this article studies
the issues of threats to and by personnel in the electric power critical infrastructure sector and their influence
and effect on dependent critical infrastructure sectors. Attention is especially given to defining these threats and
their (further) categorization into two groups: physical and cyber threats. Equally, this article also highlights the
impacts of personnel threats in dependent critical infrastructure sectors. The main part of this paper focuses on
security measures that can be used to minimize the potential impact of personnel threats. This especially con-
cerns (1) assessing the resilience of elements in the electric power critical infrastructure sector to personnel
threats, (2) defining the requirements for personnel security, and (3) the use of standard technical and in-
novative technologies to monitor and assess the activities of authorized or non-authorized persons.
1. Introduction
The critical infrastructure system (CIS) can be divided into two
areas according to its functional specificities: technical and socio-eco-
nomic infrastructures (Rehak et al., 2016). A considerable inter-
dependence exists between these infrastructure areas. All sectors of the
socio-economic area require the unlimited possibilities of disposing
services to technical infrastructure sectors, and by contrast, technical
infrastructure sectors are—in the case of a crisis situation—fully de-
pendent on the services of socio-economic sectors. Both fields, however,
have a clear dependence on the energy sector, which, on this basis, is
rightly referred to as uniquely critical (PPD-21, 2013).
Electric power critical infrastructure (EPCI) represents a highly
complex network-based system that includes the generation, transmis-
sion and distribution of electricity. As a consequence of their diversity,
their elements are continually threatened by several major high in-
tensity security threats. The most significant and hostile threat of a
global nature can clearly be considered the impact of climate change
(Mikellidou et al., 2018). However, in addition to global threats, EPCI
elements are also exposed to regional threats. The most important re-
gional threats are currently considered meteorological phenomena
(Ward, 2013) and terrorism (Morgan et al., 2012).
Today, the greatest vulnerability of EPCI elements is related to
terrorism—threats that can be very difficult to predict and whose ef-
fects cause extensive blackouts. An author team from the U.S. National
Academy of Sciences has published studies of three key areas of the
electrical power supply system that show the greatest vulnerability to
terrorist attack (Morgan et al., 2012). These areas include physical
vulnerability, cyber vulnerability and personnel vulnerability.
Several research projects (e.g. APENCOT, CIPnES, PACITA, CIPAC)
and expert publications (e.g. Garcia, 2007; Jang et al., 2009; Lovecek
et al., 2010) have been conducted in order to protect critical elements
from external intentional anthropogenic threats (i.e. physical or cyber
threats). European research into protecting critical elements from in-
ternal intentional anthropogenic threats (i.e. personnel threats) in the
energy sector is virtually non-existent, however.
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Based on this fact, the aim of this paper is to present current per-
sonnel threats in the electric power critical infrastructure and their
impacts on the dependent sectors and to formulate a possible approach
to assess the resilience of the electric power critical infrastructure ele-
ments to these personnel threats. Following this assessment approach,
the aim of the article is to define recommended measures to minimize
personnel risks in the critical infrastructure system with a focus on
procedural, cultural and technical measures.
2. Electric power critical infrastructure
The electricity grid is a very complex and interconnected network
for the production, transmission, transformation and distribution of
electricity. It includes electricity connections and direct power lines, the
equipment for measuring, protecting, controlling and signalling in-
formation, and telecommunication systems. Power grids provide elec-
tricity to billions of individuals around the world, often with over
99.9% reliability. Residents of most countries rely on the high relia-
bility of this service.
A massive disruption to electricity supply would result in the dis-
ruption of vital services (e.g. water supply, emergency and health ser-
vices), which could even lead to social unrest. An example might be
1977, when a power outage in New York led to widespread riots and the
subsequent arrest of more than 3000 individuals for illegal offenses
(Brown-Cohen, 2010).
Electrical energy infrastructure is one of the key infrastructure sub-
sectors in the European Union and includes electricity generation and
transmission infrastructure and facilities (European Council, 2008). In
the Czech Republic, the energy sector is governed by the Energy Act
(Act 458, 2000) and in addition to the above-mentioned infrastructure,
includes components for electricity distribution to consumers.
The basic principle of electricity generation is the conversion of
primary energy into electricity. Power plants categorized into thermal,
nuclear or renewable energy (i.e. water, wind and solar power) are used
for this purpose. The following can be categorized from the point of
view of production (Act 240, 2000) among the most important elec-
tricity critical infrastructure sector elements:
(a) A power plant with a total installed capacity of 500 MW or more,
(b) An operator providing supporting services with a total installed
capacity of 100 MW or more,
(c) Power lines for distributing power and securing power generation,
(d) An electricity distribution dispatching system.
The transmission of electricity in the form of very high voltage is
provided through the distribution and transmission system. For
long-distance transmissions, voltage is transformed into very high vol-
tage at a power plant and achieves values of 110 kV, 220 kV, 400 kV or
800 kV. The transmission system infrastructure consists of transformers,
cable masts, cables (conductors), compensating elements and control
and protection elements. The most important elements of critical in-
frastructure in the energy sector can be ranked in terms of the trans-
mission system (Act 240, 2000):
(a) A transmission system with a voltage of at least 110 kV,
(b) A power station transmission system with a voltage of at least
110 kV,
(c) Technical dispatching control of the transmission system by an
operator.
Very high voltage is then transformed into 35 kV or less and dis-
tributed through the distribution system to its final consumers. The
most important critical electricity infrastructure sector elements can be
also ranked in terms of distribution (Act 240, 2000):
(a) 110 kV (i.e. 110/110 kV, 110/22 kV and 110/35 kV 110/35 kV)
lines and power lines for the 110 kV distribution system and 110 kV
power lines are assessed according to their strategic importance in
the distribution system,
(b) Technical dispatch of the distribution system operator.
Based on the results of a vulnerability analysis the above-mentioned
elements (Deloitte Advisory, 2017; MIT, 2014), themain vulnerability
of critical technical infrastructure elements includes the main and
back-up technologies of the transmission system operator and the most
vulnerable elements of the power-generation critical infrastructure.
This dispatching system allows the transmission system substations to
be controlled remotely and automatically compensates for variances
between the generation and consumption of electricity. It also allows
the flow of electricity flows and voltage levels in the transmission
system to be controlled. Critical situations related to this technical
dispatch centre include:
▪ Programmable manipulations, based on the daily preparation of
network operations,
▪ Frequency regulation and power balance,
▪ Nodal area power coordination,
▪ Managing the activation of “bought-in” from support services,
▪ Exploiting the electrical energy balancing market,
▪ The purchase of regulatory energy and use of emergency assistance
from abroad,
▪ Voltage and reactive power regulation,
▪ Monitoring of transmission systems,
▪ Resolution of eventual transmission system failures,
▪ Coordination of operations with foreign Transmission System
Operators (TSOs),
▪ Detection of bottlenecks,
▪ Remote control of power supply elements,
▪ The use of system operation prediction models,
▪ The use of the higher dispatching control system functions, for ex-
ample, network calculations, re-dispatching, reconfiguration, con-
tingency analysis, etc.,
▪ Keeping operational records and documentation of all processes,
including failures,
▪ Processing event and fault records,
▪ Performing network calculations,
▪ Conducting tests,
▪ Collecting, processing and archiving data from the transmission
system.
All these activities are linked to other major distribution and
transmission system operators, including at the international level.
Basic entities that share significant links can therefore be considered
(Deloitte Advisory, 2017):
▪ Dispatchers of technical dispatching centres or power plant per-
sonnel,
▪ Distribution system dispatchers,
▪ Neighbouring transmission system operators’ dispatchers,
▪ The operation of locally controlled substations and permanent staff
services,
▪ Business partners providing regulatory energy supplies to and from
abroad.
On the basis of the points above, it is clear that personnel security
and security issues themselves are crucial, even from the point-of-view
of ensuring the continuity of society and other elements of European
critical infrastructures. The following text therefore analyses the cur-
rent security threats related to critical power infrastructures.
D. Rehak, et al. Safety Science 127 (2020) 104698
2
3. Current security threats to electric power critical infrastructure
Elements of electrical energy critical infrastructure are continuously
exposed to threats of varying nature and intensity. These threats can be
categorized according to their area of activity into three groups. The
first group consists of external threats of a global nature. This group of
threats cannot be effectively affected or minimized. The second group is
external threats of a regional nature. These threats also cannot be af-
fected, but at least in terms of elements of EPCI a sufficient level of
resilience can be built against their effects. The final group is internal
threats. This group of threats can be considerably affected by the pre-
vious groups, mainly by applying effective security measures. An
overview of current security threats affecting the EPCI is presented in
Table 1.
One group of external threats of a global nature comprises only
naturogenic and anthropogenic threats. Naturogenic threats are espe-
cially climatic and raw material threats, while anthropogenic relates to
Conflict/War threats. Climatic Threats relate to climate change on the
Earth and its global impacts such as global heating, drought, pre-
cipitation, rising sea-levels and extreme events such as floods, storms,
hurricanes and blizzards (Mikellidou et al., 2018). Raw Material
Threats relate to the use of natural resources in the functioning of EPCI.
These include, for example, lack of water or mineral resources.
The external threats group includes threats of a regional nature or
naturogenic threats, (e.g. meteorological, geological and biological),
technogenic threats, (i.e. threats arising from the cascade of effects in a
critical infrastructure system) and anthropogenic threats, (i.e. physical
and cyber). Meteorological Threats relate to negative phenomena in
the atmosphere, such as strong winds, storms, hurricanes and snow
disasters (Ward, 2013). Geological Threats relate to negative phe-
nomena in the geosphere, such as earthquakes, volcanic activity or
landslides. Biological Threats relate to the spread of harmful viruses
and bacteria that may cause epidemics, pandemics or epizootics. These
threats are not directly related to infrastructure, rather to people as-
sociated with it. Another significant group is Cascading Threats, which
are threats arising from cascading effects within a critical infrastructure
system (CIS). The risk is especially related to dependent elements,
specifically elements dependent on electricity power supplies (Rehak
et al., 2016). Physical Threats are intentional anthropogenic beha-
viour from external environments, for example, acts of terrorism or
criminal activity (Morgan et al., 2012). Cyber Threats are related to
the deliberate disruption of information and communication systems in
a critical infrastructure element. The most famous case in recent years
was the cyber-attack on Ukraine’s energy network (Knake, 2017).
The group of Internal Threats adversely affecting the performance
of CIS include process and technology threats and personnel threats.
Process and Technology Threats include technological breakdown of
the affected elements, for example, radiation accidents, dangerous
chemical leaks, extensive civil engineering disruptions and water-dis-
tribution and water resource related accidents. The biggest power in-
frastructure disruption ever occurred in 2005—the Java-Bali blackout
(BBC, 2005). Its cause was a technical failure in one of the power lines
that subsequently spread like domino effect to the distribution system
stations, resulting in several power plants being disconnected from the
grid.
Personnel Threats are situations when an employee or other au-
thorized person is a risk factor. These threats can be further categorized
into unintentional and intentional (Morgan et al., 2012). Uninten-
tional Personnel Threats include an insufficient awareness of security,
insufficiently qualified personnel or human error. The most famous
example is the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident in 1986, which
occurred as a result of the insufficiently attempted and inadequately
competent personnel (NEI, 2015). By contrast, intentional personnel
threats are for the purpose of, for example, personal enrichment, re-
venge or achieving ulterior goals (i.e. the essence of terrorism).
4. Personnel threats in electric power critical infrastructure
The starting point for defining personnel threats to electrical energy
critical infrastructure was analysing and assessing the current level of
risk from the perspective of critical infrastructure entities (i.e. operators
or owners) in the context of personnel security at critical infrastructure
elements (Deloitte Advisory, 2017). The analysis clearly showed a long-
term absence of a certain communal approach, which would, also from
a terminological point of view, express the same level of threat in the
area. Equally obvious is the absence of a common, and to a certain
extent, universal catalogue of risks for the generation, transmission and
distribution of electricity.
An outcome of this unsatisfactory situation was a catalogue of basic
categories of personnel threats in EPCI according to the analytical work
of security research projects (Table 2).
Key risks were subsequently identified in each category, analysed
and evaluated. The methodological basis was the RISKAN risk analysis
support tool (2015), which allows a semi-quantitative risk assessment.
The Risk Ratio (R) is thus determined as the product of the point values
of the following variables: asset value (A), asset vulnerability (V), and
probability of threat failure (P). It should be noted that the value of the
asset (i.e. potential impact) is based on selected criteria for identifying
and determining critical infrastructure elements, for example, the
number of people killed or injured, economic impacts or the effects on
society’s quality of life (European Council, 2008).
All variables were rated from 1 (representing a low asset value, asset
vulnerability or likelihood of threat) to 5 points (representing a high
asset value, asset vulnerability or likelihood of threat). Table 3 shows
the results of a practical risk analysis, and the categorization of risks is
to some extent a generalization of the analysis results preceded by the
semi-quantitative risk assessment. The outcome of this evaluation dif-
ferentiated the risks according to the numerical values obtained.
The final result of assessment was the creation of a comprehensive
yet generally compiled personnel risk catalogue (Table 3), whose
principle is the classification of risks into three levels (RISKAN, 2015):
▪ Critical risks (Red), reaching 71 or more points,
▪ Unacceptable risks (Yellow), reaching values of 41 to 70 points,
▪ Acceptable risks (Green), reaching values of 1 to 40 points.
Table 1
Current security threats to electric power critical infrastructure.
Naturogenic Technogenic Anthropogenic
External threats
– global
Climatic threats
Raw material
threats
(X) Conflict/War
threats
External threats
– regional
Meteorological
threats
Geological threats
Biological threats
Cascading threats Physical threats
Cyber threats
Internal threats (X) Process and
technological
threats
Personnel threats
Table 2
Categories of personnel threats in electric power critical infra-
structure.
Physical threats Cyber threats
Physical theft Data breaches
Physical loss Ransomware
Physical damage Information leakage
Injury Identity theft
Threatening Cyber espionage
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Table 3 is also a type of intersection of partial analysis results and
can also be considered a result of understanding the sector and per-
ceiving its risks (i.e. generation, transmission and distribution of elec-
tricity). It can be generally stated that the table presents and considers
the risks sorted according to intentional or unintentional human error.
The presented risk catalogue is to some extent a generalization of
ascertained facts, even with regard to the requirements of operators and
owners of critical infrastructure. Generalization reflects the need to
reduce the sensitivity of data presented in relation to their practical size
and potential impact on security and resilience.
This catalogue has been verified by leading domestic and foreign
electricity companies and subsequently discussed with and approved by
the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic. From the
results of this catalogue, concrete assessments of the resilience of
critical energy infrastructure elements with regard to personnel
threats can be achieved (section 6). If specific weaknesses are iden-
tified in the resilience assessment, some of the recommended mea-
sures for minimizing personnel risks should be applied and im-
plemented (section 7).
5. Impact of personnel threats on dependent sectors
Personnel threats in the electricity generation sector, especially in-
tentional threats, pose a serious risk to the critical infrastructure
system. The effects of these threats are undesirable events that result in
disruptions or even temporary failures in the performance of the given
element that can lead to large power outages. A cascade effect may also
occur in the critical infrastructure system (Rinaldi et al., 2001) in which
the disruption of power supply causes the disruption or failure of de-
pendent elements across all sectors (Fig. 1).
From Fig. 1 above, it is clear that critical infrastructure represents a
very closely interconnected system. This potentially could lead to the
occurrence of extensive cascade effects. In the case of disruption to
power supply, the first line represents a primary impact (red) on de-
pendent sector elements. These impacts may demonstrate different in-
tensities, the greatest of these affecting water supply, health services,
information and communication systems, financial markets and cur-
rencies elements and public administration. By contrast, the food in-
dustry and agricultural sector will not be as greatly affected (Oulehlova,
2017).
Secondary impacts (orange) – these impacts provide equally
varying degrees of intensity. The greatest of these effects are on fi-
nancial markets and currency sectors, emergency services, public ad-
ministration and transport sectors.
Tertiary impacts (purple) – disruption to power distribution will
spread, for example, because of distortion in the transport sector’s
elements. The impacts with the greatest intensity will affect emergency
services, health services, water supply services, the food industry and
agricultural sectors. Power supply disruption will occur, for example, as
a result of outages in information and communication system elements.
Beside the effects of power supply disruptions and in addition to
cascading effects, the critical infrastructure system also can be affected
by Synergistic Effects. These entail the added effects of combined in-
teractions and thus increase the sum of the impact (Rehak et al., 2016).
An example of this may be the mutual effects of the primary, secondary
and tertiary impacts of power supply disruption to emergency services
elements.
In this case, the cumulative impact of disruptions to power supply,
information and communication systems and traffic will be greater than
the individual impacts. Secondary impacts (orange) – power supply
disruptions will occur, for example, because of outage of information
and communication system components. These impacts also show dif-
ferent degrees of intensity. The greatest intensity relates to financial
and currency markets, emergency services, public administration and
transport sectors. Tertiary impacts (purple) – power supply disruptions
will occur, for example, because of distortion to the elements of the
sector to the right. The impacts with the greatest intensity will then
affect elements of the emergency services, health services, water
supply, food industry and agriculture.
6. Assessment of the resilience of EPCI elements to personnel
threats
An important factor in the functionality of EPCI elements is their
resilience to disruptive events (i.e. the negative impact of threats on
these elements). In the critical infrastructure context, resilience is un-
derstood as the ability to reduce the magnitude, impact, or duration of a
disruption. The effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure depends upon its
ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a po-
tentially disruptive event (NIAC, 2009). According to this, it can be stated
that the resilience of critical infrastructure elements is determined by
three basic components: (1) robustness (ensuring the absorption
Table 3
Catalogue of personnel risks in electric power critical infrastructure.
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capacity of the element), (2) recoverability (ensuring the rapid recovery
potential of the element) and (3) adaptability (ensuring the adaptation
potential of the element to disruptive events already occurring).
The term resilience was first defined by Holling (1973) in connec-
tion with the resistance and stabilization of ecological systems (later
socio-ecological systems). In this context, resilience can be understood
as measure of the persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change
and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between popula-
tions or state variables. The difference between the resistance and the
resilience of ecosystems was subsequently defined by Sugden (2001):
The “resistance” of an ecosystem to a perturbation, such as the introduction
of an alien species, is a measure of how much the system changes. Its “re-
silience” is the extent to which it can recover after the source of change is
removed.
In this context, it can be stated that the resistance of critical infra-
structure ensures that no disruptive event occurs. It is therefore a pre-
ventive measure, namely crisis preparedness and physical resistance of
the infrastructure. While the essence of critical infrastructure resilience
is to dampen the impact of an already occurring disruptive event and
the subsequent recovery and adaptation of the infrastructure to that
event. However, at present, resistance in the context of critical infra-
structure is not defined separately but is seen as part of the robustness
absorption capacity (NIAC, 2009).
Assessing the resilience of EPCI to personnel threats can be con-
sidered a significant preventive measure that leads to the early identi-
fication of weaknesses or even vulnerable locations. Resilience assess-
ment is based on the semi-quantitative assessment of twelve key areas
(Rehak et al., 2019):
▪ Crisis preparedness, physical resistance, redundancy, detection
capability and responsiveness (determining the robustness of the
element),
▪ Material resources, financial resources, human resources and re-
covery processes (determining the element’s recoverability),
▪ Risk management, innovation processes and education and devel-
opment processes (determining the element’s adaptability).
A set of measurable items was created for each area in order to
identify the current element’s resilience to personnel threats according
to different variants. Examples of measurable items and their variants
for “robustness/crisis preparedness” is presented in Table 4.
The point rating presented in Table 4 is based on the principle of
linear ascendancy, in which the difference between individual point
values is directly proportional. In practice, for example, this means an
increase from 1 to 2 is the same as an increase from 4 to 5. The value of
this increase is 20%. This principle is also valid in cases where the as-
sessment scale includes three values, for example, 1, 3 and 5. In this
case, the increase of value between 1 and 3 and between 3 and 5 is 40%.
In the final stage of assessing the resilience of EPCI elements, an
assessment of the individual measurable variables is required. These
variables are assessed at:
▪ High level of resilience (5): measurable variables in this category
have excellent parameters that determine a high level of element
resilience and therefore no further action is required.
▪ Acceptable level of resilience (4): measurable variables in this
category provide very good parameters that can be improved but are
not essential for overall element resilience.
▪ Low level of resilience (3): measurable variables in this category
provide sufficient parameters although improving the resilience of
the element to personnel threats is expected.
▪ Insufficient level of resilience (2): measurable variables in this
category show very poor parameters that significantly reduce ele-
ment resilience to personnel threats.
▪ Critical level of resilience (1): measurable variables in this cate-
gory either completely fail or show a critically low level of para-
meters. These items need to be completely revised, established or
restored as soon as possible.
Fig. 1. Dependence of critical infrastructure sectors on electric power supply.
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Table 4
Measurable items for assessing the robustness (crisis preparedness) of EPCI elements to personnel threats (Rehak et al., 2018).
Measurable items Description Points evaluation
Responsibilities, obligations,
powers
The aim is to assess the extent to which the responsibilities, obligations
and powers of roles involved in administrative activities have been
defined.
5: These are defined for all administrative activity roles.
3: These are defined for selected administrative activity roles.
1: No defined administrative activity roles.
Employee scrutiny The objective is to assess whether the following has occurred:
– The definition of conditions for scrutinizing information about job
seekers (availability of two good references, checking the candidate’s CV,
verification of education and qualifications, independent identity
verification).
– The definition of procedures for verifying an employee’s reliability.
– The definition of regular reviews of all employees’ work.
– The detection of dissatisfaction/personal/financial problems that may
lead to errors or other security implications.
5: All criteria were met.
4: The first three criteria were met.
3: Two criteria were met.
2: One criterion was met.
1: None of the criteria were met.
Data protection agreements The aim is to assess whether defined procedures are in place to ensure the
data protection contract is signed (e.g. confidentiality agreements,
contract of employment, etc.) where necessary.
5: Data protection is addressed in each signed contract.
3: Data protection is addressed in selected contracts.
1: Data protection is not addressed in signed contracts.
Employment activity
performance conditions
The aim is to assess whether the content of the provisions on data
protection, the obligations of beneficiaries, which should last for a certain
period of time after termination of the employment relationship, and the
steps in non-compliance are described and established.
5: Relationships with employees are defined by data protection
provisions, even after termination of employment, and breaches
are described as non-compliance.
3: Relationships with employees are defined by data protection
provisions, non-compliance steps are described.
1: No data protection provisions are defined in relation to the
employee.
Employee training The aim is to assess whether:
– The definition of mandatory security training is established.
– The definition of training content (inclusion of security requirements
and legal responsibilities) and description of relevant control mechanisms
exist.
– Evidence of trained staff and regular training.
5: All criteria were met.
3: Two criteria were met.
1: No criteria were met.
Personnel management The aim is to determine whether:
– Personnel management is specifically resolved in the subject’s security
plan.
– The facility has appointed a security manager to manage the personnel
security process.
– Security managers are aware of the procedures for requesting approval
and authorization of access.
– Initial and annual safety awareness training is provided to all
employees.
– Training records are archived.
– The entity has a comprehensive personnel security policy.
– Local audits are performed on a regular basis in order to ensure that
personnel security is in line with the security policy.
– Directors or security managers are immediately informed about security
incidents that may have an influence on verifying personal identity.
– The security manager knows what steps should be taken when
defamatory and misleading information about an individual is received.
– A register of access is available.
5: All criteria were met.
4: 8/10 criteria were met.
3: 5/10 criteria were met.
2: 3/10 criteria were met.
1: Less than 3 criteria were met.
Personnel reliability The aim is to assess whether:
– The reliability of personnel is a component of the given subject’s
security plan.
– All employees underwent the process of reliability controls before they
have access to selected assets.
– Induction training and certificates of completion were passed on to
employees prior to being allowed access to selected assets.
– The employee signed a commercial confidentiality agreement prior to
gaining access to the selected assets.
– All employees with unauthorized access to selected assets have been
screened and verified, and access has been restricted.
5: All criteria were met.
4: 4/5 criteria were met.
3: 3/5 criteria were met.
2: 2/5 criteria were met.
1: Less than 2 criteria were met.
Human resources management The objective is to assess whether:
– Human resources management is specifically resolved in the subject’s
security plan.
– All employees are required to complete the control checklist on
application and prior to recruitment.
– A principle is in place to ensure all employees who require access to
selected assets are monitored.
– Employees are assigned to positions with specific access rights.
– Each employee position is associated with a record of potential risks.
– All positions are designated with the correct safety classification.
– Minimum educational training and examination criteria are set for those
responsible for physical safety.
– Pre-employment screening processes prior to the acceptance of selected
persons include checks on relevant links, previous employment record,
education, professional training and professional certificates.
5: All criteria were met.
4: 4/5 criteria were met.
3: 3/5 criteria were met.
(continued on next page)
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7. Recommended measures for minimizing personnel risks in
critical infrastructures
Based on identifying specific personnel risks (Table 3) and the re-
sults of the EPCI element resilience assessment, adequate measures can
be applied to minimize risk. These measures are categorized into three
groups: procedural, cultural and technical measures. Procedural
measures consist of defining the personnel security requirements. Cul-
tural measures establish the need and responsibility for the security of
the entrusted property. Technical measures include the use of standard
technology for monitoring and evaluating the activities of authorized
persons (i.e. use of intruder and hold-up alarm systems and systems
using GPS localization) and the development of innovative technolo-
gies. In addition to the above-mentioned measures, this section in-
troduces new technologies that have been developed from recognizing
discrepancies in the behaviour of individuals in real-time through deep
structured learning methods.
It is important to acknowledge that the source of personnel threats
(intentional and unintentional anthropogenic threats) are those in-
dividuals with process or access rights (i.e. the logical or physical ap-
proach). It is very important to be aware of persons with specific pri-
vileges. Not every employee of an organization (or employees of a
supply or customer organization) represents an internal personnel
threat to all of the organization’s processes and services. For example, a
maintenance employee has access to a distribution transformer but no
access to the data centre, while for a data analyst, the situation is re-
versed. The maintenance employee will therefore be an internal per-
sonnel threat in relation to the distribution transformer, but for the data
centre, they will be an external threat (physical or cyber). Analogously,
this is also be valid for the data analyst.
7.1. Procedural measures
The essence of implementing procedural requirements is defining
the requirements of personnel security. This area has been defined
under a comprehensive or integrated protection management system
based on analysis and consultation with relevant authorities in the
critical infrastructure field. It is also perceived as a system for selecting
individuals with regard to access to the subject’s information assets,
verification of access to information assets, training and protection.
The requirements focus on minimizing the impact of human error, po-
tential theft or fraud or misuse of the organization’s information assets.
With regard to creating these personnel security requirements, the
following areas are seen as with special interest:
▪ Responsibilities, obligations and competencies,
▪ Employee screening,
▪ Data protection agreements,
▪ Work performance conditions,
▪ Staff training,
▪ Response to security incidents and failures,
▪ Disciplinary processes,
▪ Response to security incidents and failures,
▪ Termination of the employment relationship.
Specific requirements for individual areas in personnel security are
presented in Table 5.
The creation of a purposeful and effective preventive measures
system against internal intentional personnel threats requires an
awareness of a certain oxymoron: the more we trust a person (give them
certain competencies), the more we should not trust them (e.g. un-
authorized behaviour). This approach should be applied throughout the
employment lifecycle of the eligible person, specifically from the mo-
ment an authorization is granted (e.g. selection procedures or workload
allocations) to when it is rescinded (e.g. termination of employment) or
even for some time after it is rescinded.
Table 4 (continued)
Measurable items Description Points evaluation
2: 2/5 criteria were met.
1: Less than 2 criteria were met.
Note: The measurable items in Table 4 apply only to the crisis preparedness which is a subgroup of robustness. It is therefore a preventive measure representing the
resistance of a critical infrastructure element. For this reason, these measurable items have no meaningful value about absorbing the effects of a disruptive event or
subsequent recovery and adapting a critical infrastructure element to that event.
Table 5
Personnel security requirements.
Area Requirements
Responsibilities, obligations and powers – The definition of obligations and powers for roles associated with administrative activities.
Employee security clearance – The definition of security reliability scanning procedures, (e.g. the availability of two sufficient references, checking the
candidate’s CV, verifying education and qualifications, independent verification of identity).
– The definition of a procedure for verifying employee reliability.
– The definition of regular employee obligations and performance reviews.
– The definition of a procedure for providing information about private circumstances that could lead to mistakes or have other
security implications (frequent absence, stress, depression, personal and financial problems, behavioural and lifestyle
changes, etc.).
Data protection agreements – The definition of a procedure for signing a data protection agreement, (e.g. employment contract confidentiality agreements,
etc.) where necessary.
Work performance conditions – The definition of providing data protection content. The obligation of authorized persons should endure for some time after
the termination of an employment relationship, and steps should be established for situations when conditions are not met.
Staff training – The definition of mandatory security training.
– The definition of training content for security requirements, legal responsibilities and relevant control mechanisms, including
descriptions and summaries.
– Trained staff and regular training records.
Reactions to security incidents and failures – The definition of procedures for reporting security incidents and vulnerabilities.
Disciplinary processes – The definition of procedures for violations of security measures or non-compliance with the organization’s work practices.
Termination of the employment relationship – The definition of procedures for returning assets held by employees, registration.
– The definition of procedures for removing access permissions.
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7.2. Cultural measures
The term safety culture was first used in 1986 by a group of
International Atomic Energy Agency workers after the Chernobyl nu-
clear reactor accident (IAEA, 1991). The investigative team surveying
the accident concluded that the main reason for the reactor overheating
were deficiencies associated with the organization’s safety culture.
After this event, safety culture was at the centre of interest for opti-
mizing the impact of corporate culture on employee behaviour in re-
lation to security.
Several prominent authors have devoted themselves to defining
safety culture and safety climate over the past 30 years (e.g. Cox and
Cox, 1991; Hale, 2000; Mohamed, 2003; Halaj et al., 2018). These
authors consistently argue that safety culture reflects the attitudes,
beliefs, perceptions and values that employees share in relation to
safety. These attitudes, beliefs and perceptions that organizations define
as norms and values affect their actions and responses to risks. Safety
culture is therefore influenced by the unconscious behaviour of the
organization’s employees in safety matters.
Without achieving the necessary security awareness, individuals
cannot fully perform their tasks, thereby disrupting the whole system.
New risks and threats confirm the importance of building individual
security awareness, as a lack of security awareness can be considered a
threat (Brvnistan, 2016).
7.3. Technical measures
The personnel security requirements defined above cover the entire
lifecycle of the involvement of employees in an organization. However,
it is appropriate, even necessary, to implement certain technical mea-
sures in order to ensure that certain requirements are met. These in-
clude, for example, requirements such as defining the routine mon-
itoring of all employee work performance, defining employee reliability
check procedures, or defining security incident and weaknesses re-
porting procedures.
In the course of their usual activities, authorized individuals can
move around in normal physical space or cyber space. Technical
measures for standard monitoring of persons in a given physical
space have long made use of surveillance systems such VSS/CCTV
systems, ACS systems or I&HAS, or more recently, GPS-based systems.
Software and hardware solutions can now be employed to monitor and
regulate the activities of authorized persons in a virtual space through
logs that record all activity. An overview of technical resources for
monitoring and evaluating authorized persons in virtual and physical
space is presented in Table 6.
All of the above-mentioned technical measures allow the activities
of authorized persons to be monitored and evaluated. The common
disadvantages of these measures are their ability to react after or im-
minently prior to an undesirable event. One of the standard measures
that would, with sufficient lead time, expose the intended intentions of
an authorized person well in advance is a polygraph test. However, this
solution is accompanied by pitfalls involving capacity, legal or proce-
dural reasons. Another solution would be to cross-check or double-
check the activities of authorized persons. This would, however, lead to
doubling wage costs and simultaneously creating of investment costs
associated with modifying access points (e.g. software application au-
thentication processes or physical access points such as lock systems or
card readers).
Another disadvantage of standard measures for monitoring and
evaluating the activities of authorized persons is that in many cases
they cannot detect the potential identity theft of a person with access
rights. According to statistics from 2017 (Gooden, 2017), 85% of in-
trusions into buildings and sites is facilitated by identity theft.
The deficiencies mentioned above, or limitations of standard pro-
tective measures can be minimized by applying innovative technol-
ogies based on recognizing discrepancies in the real-time behaviour of
individuals. This may include, for example, intelligent video analysis by
security cameras or analysis of user activity in the information system
(e.g. from logs or mouse-movements on the screen). The monitoring
system learns the common patterns of behaviour of individual author-
ized persons and can—in real-time—evaluate each time a person enters
the site or information system whether their behaviour differs from
their usual patterns. An intelligent system could take advantage of
the innovative deep machine learning methods (LeCun et al., 2015),
which function similarly to how a child learns. At each additional ac-
cess, it analyses an individual’s movements and learns to assign dif-
ferent details in those movements (locomotion), for example, how they
show or swipe their identification card as they pass through a scanned
area (such as a turnstile), or mouse movements on a screen. If these
details differ significantly, it alerts a relevant authorized person of
discrepancies in the usual pattern of behaviour, which may, for ex-
ample, indicate a possible identity theft (i.e. when an unauthorized
person impersonates a person with access rights). Changes in behaviour
may also be due to other factors such as medical issues or the ingestion
of alcohol or drugs. As well as security, the use of this method has long
been applied to disaster and crisis management (Zagorecki et al., 2013).
At present, the most powerful deep learning systems are based on
convolutional neural networks (Ciresan et al., 2011) that form a part of
the input information process. These neural networks consist of layers
of small computing units, so-called neurons, which send the processed
information in a hierarchical manner. When convolutional neural net-
works are trained in the context of a recognition process, they create a
representation of information whose complexity grows progressively in
the hierarchical process. For example, in VSS/CCTV systems, the first
layer determines where light and dark are in the input image. The next
determines the edges, other shapes, consequent objects (e.g. humans) or
individual types of objects (e.g. man or woman) in an overall assess-
ment of the situation and subsequently to an overall understanding of
its meaning (e.g. the position and movements of the person in the
scene).
In the case of applying the deep learning method to standard
technical measures in a physical or cyber environment, they can be
Table 6
Standard technical resources for monitoring and evaluating the activities of authorized persons.
Physical environment Cyber environment
Video surveillance system (VSS) Intrusion detection system (IDS).
Access control systems (ACS): Logical anti-passback, timed anti-passback, area controlled anti-passback. Intrusion prevention systems (IPS).
Intrusion and hold-up alarm systems (I&HAS). Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS).
GPS tracking and monitoring system. Information leak detection and prevention (ILDP).
Polygraph. Information leak prevention (ILP).
Content monitoring and filtering (CMF).
Information protection and control (IPC).
Extrusion prevention system (EPS).
Data loss prevention (DLP).
2FA – Two factor authentication.
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referred to as behavioural biometric systems. In these systems, several
measurable quality indicators can be monitored: FAR – False
Acceptance Rate, FRR – False Rejection Rate, EER – Equal Error Rate
(Lovecek et al., 2015). From the point of view of breaking this measure,
the most relevant parameter is FAR, which expresses the likelihood that
a biometric security system will incorrectly accept an unauthorized
access attempt (Benaliouche and Touahria, 2014). Nowadays, manu-
facturers of standard technical measures already have this data in-
cluded in their products.
Deep learning can accurately identify patterns in data and refine
them step by step. Once a pattern can be unambiguously assigned to a
human identity, it can be considered a behavioural biometric feature.
The biometric matching algorithm (which is not necessarily related to
deep learning but may be based on a neural or convolutional neural
network) for determining a particular pattern of behaviour and identity
has a FAR and FRR curve. The risk of accepting an unauthorized person
depends on the threshold value set to the level where an identity is
already considered the same. This threshold expresses certain FAR and
FRR values. The higher the threshold, the lower the risk that an un-
authorized person will be granted access. The risk that an authorized
person will not be accepted also increases, however.
Indeed, the use of deep learning in security is quite new. Research
results in this area have only been available for the past few years. The
innovative nature of the issue (i.e. deep learning and the proposed
procedures themselves) is demonstrated by the ever-growing number of
international scientific publications in the field (Fig. 2).
Obtaining accurate data requires longer-term analysis of statistical
data, but in any case, the application of this method has increased
significantly, as deep learning is much more accurate and quicker than
any other method (Dai and Braytont, 2017; Al-Waisy et al., 2017; Zhu
et al., 2017).
The application of new tools such as machine learning or deep
learning to existing standard technical resources (Table 6) can provide
new options for protective measures. These new measures will then be
able to more effectively monitor and evaluate not only the activities but
also the behaviour of authorized persons and therefore prevent poten-
tial personnel threats.
8. Conclusion
Personnel threats, especially intentional threats in the EPCI sector,
represent a serious risk to entire critical infrastructure systems. The
effect of these threats leads to undesirable events that could result in
disruptions or temporary failures in any given element’s performance
and consequently lead to large electrical power outages. These outages
have far-reaching impacts, not only on society itself but also on the
dependent critical infrastructure sectors and elements. These sectors are
in particular: water supply, health services, information and commu-
nication systems, financial market and currency, and public adminis-
tration.
An important preventive measure leading to the early identification
of weak or even critical locations is assessing the resilience of EPCI
elements to personnel threats. This assessment is based on the assess-
ment of measurable items in twelve basic areas that determine the basic
components of resilience, i.e. robustness, recoverability and adapt-
ability. The result of this evaluation is the classification of measurable
items into five categories characterizing the achieved level of resilience
(i.e. high, acceptable, low, insufficient and critical level).
From the results of this assessment, adequate security measures for
minimizing personnel threats can be adopted by a critical infrastructure
owner or operator (i.e. the owner or operator of a given critical
Infrastructure element). These measures may be of a procedural, cul-
tural or technical nature. The essence of implementing procedural
measures is to define the requirements for individual areas of personnel
security, for example, responsibilities, obligations and rights, employee
screening, data protection agreements, work performance conditions,
employee training, responses to security incidents and failures, dis-
ciplinary processes, termination of employment relationships, etc.
The essence of implementing cultural measures is to raise employee
awareness and interest in security. Technical measures include the use
of standard technical resources for monitoring and evaluating the ac-
tivities of authorized persons (e.g. intruder and hold-up alarm systems
or GPS localization systems) and the development of innovative tech-
nologies based on, for example, recognizing discrepancies in the be-
haviour of individuals in real-time through machine learning and deep
learning methods.
Identifying weak and critical locations to protect against a personnel
threats and the suitable implementation of adequate security measures
will lead to a significant reduction in personnel risks and threats and the
strengthening of EPCI security. This approach would also significantly
contribute to stabilizing the functions of dependent sectors in a critical
infrastructure system. In conclusion, although the article is focused on
Fig. 2. Number of SCOPUS deep learning publications in the context of security.
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the context of the Czech Republic, the proposed procedures are fully
applicable to any electricity system operator.
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